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Home equity release products have been promoted as a potential solution to residential long term care costs for the 
elderly. Unexpectedly low utilization of home equity release loans has prompted efforts to better model and price the 
No-Negative-Equity-Guarantee (NNEG) built into the contracts, but loan rates are still widely perceived by 
homeowners as being unattractive.. We propose the introduction of a new adjustable rate loan based on a regional 
house price index, with the NNEG being borne by a specially created intermediary. The proposed approach allows 
us to directly address and separately price the basis risk between individual house price returns and index returns. 
Additionally, it offers the opportunity to create securities based on residential real estate that would be attractive to 
a wider class of investors. The alternative risk-sharing mechanism creates a more transparent and simple pricing 
structure for the loans. We then use house sales data to demonstrate the approach. We find in our sample that it 
would be possible to make higher loans than seen in previous literature using standard roll-up contracts. In the 
most favourable scenario for our simulations, the maximum loan is 89 per cent of the appraised home value if the 
loan is advanced as a lump sum and 95 per cent if the loan is advanced in instalments.  
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In many countries, home equity represents a substantial portion of the net worth of the population over age 55. Many 
members of this older age cohort will be required to fund their own care costs at a level exceeding their incomes. As 
a result, it will become more necessary for them to access the equity in their home. A standard method to do this is 
to sell the home, but this raises the question of where the individuals will reside. Related considerations arise as to 
whether it is preferable to rent or downsize, remain in the same neighbourhood or relocate. Further there are 
logistical issues regarding moving, discarding, selling or otherwise disposing of property and the transaction costs 
that might be incurred. For many, there appears to be a desire to remain in the home, which may generate a 
“possession value” that is greater than the market value on sale. To accommodate the combined desires of providing 
access to home equity and enabling the homeowners to remain in their homes, home equity release (HER) products 
have been developed.  
The usefulness of HER in old age has been long recognised e.g., see Leather (1990). Recently, more attention is 
being paid to the potential for HER to assist in funding long term care (see e.g. Andrews, 2009, 2012; Dilnot et al., 
2011; Hancock, 2000; NIHE, 2010). However, the take-up on these products in the United Kingdom, Canada and 
the United States has been very limited. In this paper we describe a proposal for a competitive market framework 
that would help unlock housing wealth, with the specific objective of providing funds for the care expenses of an 
aging population while allowing them the option to age in place. We show with the help of house price data how this 
structure leads to a potentially more efficient risk-sharing mechanism, and to a more transparent pricing model. 
Many of the HER loans (sometimes on account of legislation) contain a provision often referred to as the 
No-Negative-Equity-Guarantee (NNEG). This provision implies that if the value of the home is less than the value 
of the outstanding loan, there is no further obligation to repay the loan (beyond the funds received on home sale). In 
the United Kingdom, the NNEG is a requirement of the Equity Release Council, the main industry body in the HER 
sector. Various authors have suggested, based on surveyed perceptions (Overton, 2010) or pricing models (Hosty et 
al., 2008; Li et al., 2010), that the typical price charged for the HER loans when the NNEG is present makes the 
loan unattractive to the borrower and explains, at least in part, why take-up of such products has been low. 
Hosty et al. (2008), Ji et al. (2012), and Li et al. (2010) have developed models to price the NNEG that produce 
prices considerably less than those implied from rates available in the market. These pricing approaches must 
simultaneously model several sources of risk such as interest rate risk, house price risk, and longevity risk. 
Furthermore, the models are estimated based on average house price returns rather than individual house prices, and 
they either ignore or do not directly evaluate the basis risk between an index and individual house price returns. 
From the lender’s perspective, the longevity risk built into the NNEG makes it necessary to exercise prudence in the 
size of the loan relative to the house value. As a result, the debate remains open on the necessary level of 
conservatism in determining the proportion of home value that may be offered as a loan. 
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We develop a twofold approach to this problem: we present a more transparent pricing structure that takes into 
account the known risks, while attempting to benefit from opportunities for efficient risk allocation. We also 
demonstrate this approach using individual house price data unlike existing models that are based on average 
returns. 
The first element is the social aspect of funding the Long Term Care (LTC) expenses of retired individuals. Andrews 
(2009, 2012) has suggested that the NNEG risk is more suitably borne by the state through an agency or through a 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP). He suggests that if the PPP holds the NNEG risk, the remaining loan would 
become a relatively standard mortgage product with an uncertain exit date. Further, the PPP may lay off part of the 
longevity risk by entering into swap contracts with interested counterparties. 
In this paper, we propose a specific structure for HER loans that involves a securitization and a new form of loan to 
be offered to homeowners, at an adjustable rate based on the regional house price index (HPI). The use of HPI based 
mortgages to alleviate basis risk was first proposed by Shiller and Weiss (2000). Our proposal involves the 
establishment of a centralized system that supports efficient sharing of risks and a transparent method for pricing 
HER loans. These objectives are achieved by independently pricing the NNEG consisting of basis and longevity 
risk, while offering HPI linked securities backed by physical homes. It is important to note that both elements work 
together more effectively than in isolation. For instance, the United States has a mechanism for providing NNEG 
insurance via an agency, but this has not been sufficient to increase the take up of loans due to limitations of pricing 
the long term fixed rate contracts. 
Currently, most loans are offered as fixed-rate roll-up mortgages, whereby a fixed rate of interest is accumulated in 
the mortgage until the contract is settled. Long term variations in housing prices are sometimes characterized as very 
slowly reverting to a mean trend, so a fixed rate loan presents a further element of risk relative to house price 
growth. Recent literature has focussed on modelling the dynamics of index-level returns. For instance, Li et al. 
(2010) fit an ARMA-GARCH model to monthly returns on the Nationwide Index of house prices, and formulate a 
pricing model for the NNEG as a put option based on the estimated dynamic. By unbundling the loan into an NNEG 
and a floating rate loan, it would be possible to have more competitive pricing due to improved risk-sharing 
implications over longer time horizons.  
In determining the pricing of the relative portions and demonstrating the advantages of this approach, we focus on the 
risk that price changes for individual houses are less than the changes in an HPI. This basis risk is a significant 
element of HER loan risk that has not been explicitly accounted for in previous work on pricing the NNEG. We 
argue that unbundling and quantifying this risk leads to greater efficiency in risk allocation. We also document a 
term structure in this risk and account for it in our pricing strategy. 
Using a data sample from Kent County in England, we provide a more accurate estimate of the costs involved if the 
NNEG were provided by a PPP, based on available data. The premium for the NNEG helps determine the maximum 
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permitted loan relative to the house valuation. Overall, our structure offers the potential for significantly raising the 
proportion of house value available to the elderly seeking to cover residential care costs. 
Our structuring and data work also offer some additional benefits with respect to the current state of the market and the 
NNEG pricing approach. With respect to the data, our use of the Land Registry’s HPI, which is a repeat-sales index 




With respect to the investment market, we have proposed the creation of a security that would offer investors 
exposure to regional residential real estate prices. Given the significant variation over time of the regional distribution 
of house price changes (Dorling and Cornford, 1995), such securities would serve to fill an important gap in the 
portfolios of several investors, especially pension funds interested in long term real estate exposures. As these 
securities would be backed by actual homes, they could aid in a more efficient determination of prices by 
complementing the derivative contracts. The derivatives markets in residential real estate are still relatively limited 
compared to those for other assets such as equity and commodities. The absence of liquid and transparently 
structured securities backed by real estate implies that pricing models for derivatives, even those with linear payoffs, 
are complex and challenging to implement.
2
  
It may be important to broaden the base of possible investors. Currently the maturity profile of HER suits the 
liability matching requirements of insurers and specialized investors, who are the main lenders under HER 
schemes.
3
 However, the diversification potential of housing equity investments can be accessed by a wider investor 
base under the proposed scheme, helping alleviate any potential constraints on supply of funds. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the proposed structure for the HER 
product and related market arrangements. We present the methodology and data in Section 3, and our results in 
Section 4. Section 5 discusses an extension of the structure, with a further possibility to reallocate risks. The final 
section identifies some areas for future research and concludes. 
2. An Alternative HER Product and its Pricing 
The structure we propose involves a central intermediary, ideally in the form of a PPP. The PPP would receive 
applications from home owners in need of funds to finance LTC while living in their home (i.e. aging in place). The 
applicants may not require institutional LTC at the time of application, but may require funds for residential care or 
                                                          
1
 The advantages of repeat-sales indices are widely known (Bailey et al. 1963; Case and Shiller 1987, 1989). For 
more information on the construction of the index, see Calnea Analytics (2007). 
2
 Fabozzi et al. (2012), for instance, rely on the assumption that the market price of risk is known. 
3
 We thank a referee for pointing out that reduced annuity sales under new pension regulations in the UK may lower 
demand for HER assets among insurers. 
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to modify the home to make it more accommodating to the applicant’s needs and mobility. In our simulations, we 
assume that the borrowers are a couple aged 65, with one partner requiring care and the other healthy. 
Andrews (2012) has stated several reasons that the PPP structure is desirable. The loan would include a NNEG 
provision. The state may be better placed to bear this risk and may also be able to use some of the homes acquired 
for social housing. The PPP structure provides a vehicle for the state to pass some of the risk to the private sector 
through a residual account, and to enhance the attractiveness and availability of the HER product. 
The PPP would process the applications, which would include an appraisal of the home, a determination of the 
amount of equity, an assessment of its prospects for house price inflation in line with an established HPI, and an 
underwriting of the mortality and morbidity (i.e., the LTC risk that will affect the time of sale of the home and the 
cessation of the loan). The PPP would then specify the maximum loan amount and the loan rate basis. Once the PPP 
carries out an evaluation of the NNEG, it screens investors to get the best terms for the borrower. We label the initial 
value of the house as V0, and the NNEG premium as c.  
The investors forward the loan funds, and then the loan accumulates interest and an NNEG premium until the exit 
date. The interest consists of the floating rate basis, plus an annual charge m. This annual charge is designed to cover 
both an administrative fee for the PPP, and a fee representing administrative expense for the lender along with the 
‘income component’ of housing returns. The administration charge for the PPP is in respect of loan application, 
initiation, and underwriting and on-going inspection and maintenance of the property. As the HPI reflects average 
capital growth in house prices, the loan must also include a charge representing the income generated by residential 
real estate investment (based on standard no-arbitrage arguments). Given the potential liquidity and lower 
transaction cost of the securities when managed through the proposed structure, we argue this charge should be 
bounded from above by the net rental yield (after ownership, maintenance, vacancy period expenses, and rental 
management costs). This charge would be determined by the market, and thus we allow for a range of values in our 
simulation below. 
Exit from the contract is assumed to occur when the homeowners move out due to a change in their circumstances, 
as specified in the methodology section below. At the time of exit, investors are repaid based on the accrued loan 
(minus the PPP’s administrative fee), while the NNEG charge is retained by the PPP. Thus, the total return to the 
investor is the sum of the floating and fixed parts, and may be negative if the HPI falls below the accumulated fixed 
charge. While this is similar to an equity investment in housing, it would presumably outperform such an investment 
if rents fall in line with HPI. The roles of the various parties are described in Figure 1 and the associated cash flows 
are in Figure 2. This versatile structure does not preclude other forms of securitization, such as the initiation and 
bundling of loans by a PPP, as long as the valuation parameters are agreed in advance.  
The standard HER loan, referred to as a roll-up mortgage, is based on a fixed interest rate. Instead, we consider 
writing the loan on an adjustable rate, i.e., floating rate based on the rate of return on the regional HPI. We argue 
that this allows for a more efficient pricing approach as it does away with a major problem of predicting long-term 
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real estate price movements. Also, Shiller and Weiss (2000) suggest that providing an incentive to the 
homeowner-borrower to maintain the property may reduce the “moral hazard” problem and result in better 
performing loans. This adjustable rate approach maintains the interest of the homeowner-borrower in the on-going 
pricing of the loan, which may result in greater attention to property maintenance resulting in improved loan 
performance and a lower NNEG charge. Finally, the resulting creation of securities that is based on average regional 
house price appreciation would be attractive to several investor classes. 
Figure 1. Role of PPP in arranging home equity loans 
 
One explanation for observed conservatism in pricing HER loans is that price appreciation of a particular property 
may be difficult to predict. Although HPI may increase in a way that is readily modelled, a particular house may not 
keep pace with HPI. In previous papers on NNEG pricing, this source of risk has not been directly treated.
4
 Shiller 
and Weiss (2000) consider that once equity has been released in the property, there may be little incentive for the 
residents to maintain the property; hence, reducing the asset value. Although they refer to “moral hazard”, a failure 
to maintain the property may be due to incapacity attributable to old age or due to (fear of) lack of income. Based on 
an analysis of Australian data, Ong (2009) found that being 75 years of age or older lowers annual house price 
appreciation by 1.4 percentage points and further that being aged 75 or older lowers home improvement expenditure 
by over AUD 3,000 per year and is attributable to a decline in income in old age. Based on a review of American 
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 Hosty et al. (2008) address this risk by raising the assumed volatility of returns. 
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Housing Survey data for the period 1985 to 2001, Davidoff (2004) observed that annual spending by homeowners 
75 and older is approximately USD 270 less on routine home maintenance and USD 1,100 less on home 
improvement than by younger homeowners with similar homes. He observed that older homeowners realize weaker 
price appreciation than younger owners of similar homes in the same markets over identical horizons by 
approximately three per cent per year. These arguments support a role for the PPP in regular inspection and 
maintenance of the property, and justify the inclusion of a small administrative fee. We envision regular (perhaps 
annual) inspections of the property and a contractual agreement that the residents maintain the property to some 
(minimum) standard. 
Figure 2. Cash flows associated with the proposed structure 
This figure explains the structure of the financing arrangement. The entire loan of L0 is realised from the lender, and 
advanced to the homeowner by the PPP at initiation (the right hand side leg). The homeowner pays the PPP the 
minimum of the home value at exit VH τ and the value of the loan determined by the change in HPI, the NNEG 
charge c and the ‘income’ charge m, which is determined by the market so that L0 is the discounted market value of 





Overall, we argue that we are presenting a more efficient allocation for society as a whole because it gives investors 
the possibility of equity-like exposure to residential real estate without the hassles of ownership, while it offers 
borrowers the access to necessary funds without the loss of ‘possession value’. While the latter objective is met by 
any HER product, the joint achievement of the two objectives at lower cost suggests the existence of an economic 
surplus that would be of interest to policymakers. 
3. Methodology and Data 
In this section, we describe in detail the methodology and data used. 
3.1 Model and Simulation Setup 
Let H be the reference HPI, and let the annualized return on H be h . The investors thus expect to receive mh  on 
the loan (L0). The NNEG charge c must then account for the fact that individual borrower house price inflation (hi) 
may not match h . If the value of the loan exceeds the price of the house on exit, the PPP is responsible for the 
difference. The value of the securities would also depend on the actual time of exit . Due to the nature of this 







where t represents the time passed since initiation of the loan. The expected time of exit at initiation of the contract 
is denoted   . 



















where   1,0   is a policy based proportion and Vi refers to the value of the home. We will henceforth assume 
that λ is 1 – note that this would imply the highest value for c. Note also that the “moral hazard” argument of Shiller 
and Weiss (2000) and their recommendation to use an index as a reference rate for the loan has the additional 
requirement the borrower must still have sufficient equity in the house, suggesting that 1  would then be more 
appropriate. However, we have assumed the administration fee and related provisions would substitute as an 
alleviation mechanism. The entire value of the loan Li,0 is realised from investors, and thus Si,0 = Li,0.  
At exit  the PPP receives    ,00, ,)(expmin itti VdtcmhL   , which is the lesser of the accrued loan and the 
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Equation 1 determines the loan value relative to the initial house value. 















t hh   and the extent to which the actual date of entry 
into LTC exceeds the expected date (the longevity risk). 
For the simulation, our approach is to determine certain conditions under which an HER loan would continue or 
would result in sale of the house underlying the loan. Ji et al. (2012) developed a semi Markov multiple state model 
for reverse mortgage terminations. They consider three different modes of reverse mortgage termination: death, 
entrance into a LTC facility, and voluntary prepayment; and also model the event-triggered dependency between the 
lifetimes of a husband and wife. They discuss Markov approaches to joint-life mortality, which is relevant to reverse 
mortgage terminations, as the termination is frequently affected by events that happen to a couple. In this paper we 
follow their mortality modelling and parameterisation. We use a Gompertz mortality model (μx = BC
x
) parameterised 
according to Ji et al. (2011, Table 3). We follow their adjustments to mortality probabilities to reflect the 
“bereavement effect” associated with death of a spouse.  
We further assume that applicants eligible for the HER loan through the PPP would be couples of approximately age 
65 at a time when one of the couple has requirements for some form of care expenditure. We use a Markov model to 
estimate the likelihood of a change in status that would result in the home having to be sold and the loan repaid, in each 
year. Once a person requires care we do not permit the possibility of recovery. We consider the following end of year 
states of the healthy partner X and care-requiring partner Y: 
1. No change in state of X and Y 
2. X healthy, Y deceased  
3. X requires care, Y requires care  
4. X deceased, Y requires care 
5. X requires care, Y deceased 
6. X deceased, Y deceased 
A change to states 3, 4, 5 or 6 would result in sale of the house and settlement of the loan. If the couple remains in state 
1 the loan continues. If the transition is to state 2 we assume that the loan continues and calculate the probability that in 
subsequent years X will be in the states: 
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7. X healthy 
8. X requires care 
9. X deceased 
Transitions to states 8 or 9 would result in sale of the home. An alternative assumption would have been to assume 
voluntary loan repayment on transition to state 2. We have not assumed any prepayments as our focus is on the issue of 
funding LTC at home. The equity position in the home will remain relative to the overall value of the home, so unlike 
traditional HER products, market-timing decisions by borrowers do not pose as big a risk to lenders under our 
structure. Lenders receive a rate of return tied to the index and can reinvest in the index at the time of prepayment. 
The expression for the calculation of the expected date of house sale is 
∑  [∏      ∑   ∏     ∏   
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   ,          , (2) 
where subscripts represent time, C represents the probability that there is no change from the original state (i.e. remain 
in State 1); x represents the probability that the state changes to X healthy Y deceased (State 2); A represents the 
probability that both partners are deceased and/or require care at the end of the year (States 3, 4, 5, or 6); B represents  
the probability that the single healthy X dies or requires care by the end of the year (States 8 or 9); D represents the 
probability that the single healthy X continues in that state (State 7). The states are determined at the end of the year. 
The associated probability tree for the first four years is shown in Figure 3. 
In the event of sale, we compare the appreciation of the index derived from the HPI, which would have been used to 
price the loan to the likely increase in the individual house’s value. Differences in price that result in the NNEG 
provision being triggered are captured. One million simulations are run to estimate the likelihood and timing of the 
triggering of the NNEG. We then calculate break-even NNEG premiums using different discount rates. Based on the 
break-even NNEG premiums we are able to determine an appropriate annual charge for the NNEG. We repeat the 
process but assume the loans were made by instalments rather than having an outstanding balance from initiation to 
final repayment. 
For the annual charge we consider a range of values ranging between 0 and 400 basis points annually, plus the 20 
basis points administration charge payable to the PPP. As a comparison, a recently launched investment product 
known as an income Housa (Castle Trust, 2014) in United Kingdom offers investors a return equal to the change in a 
national HPI plus 2-3% annual income over a fixed term of between 3 and 10 years. 
The choice of 20 basis points for the administration charge as mentioned above is arbitrary, but given its simple 
interpretation, the impact of changing this charge on the total loan eligibility is straightforward to calculate and not 




Figure 3. Probability tree for the first four years after loan initiation 
When the loan is initiated, X is the healthy partner and Y is the partner requiring care expenditures at home. C 
represents the probability that there is no change from the original state; x represents the probability that the state 
changes to X healthy Y deceased; A represents the probability that both partners are deceased and/or require care at the 
end of the year; B represents the probability that the single healthy X dies or requires care by the end of the year; D 
represents the probability that the single healthy X continues in that state. The states are determined at the end of the 




We purchased data from the United Kingdom Land Registry regarding house sales during the period January 1, 1995 
to December 31, 2011 for post codes in the county of Kent, England, CT1 and CT2, which correspond to the 
Canterbury area, and ME8, which corresponds to the Medway area. We then matched and filtered the data, so that only 
houses that were sold at least twice during the period were included. We use the first sale to determine the market price 
and subsequent sales to determine individual house returns over the relevant time horizon. We then compare this 
return to the change in the HPI for the same period pertaining to the county of Kent, as calculated and published by the 
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Land Registry. This gives us a set of data points representing the difference between actual house price increases and 
the county-wide HPI.  
Table 1(a). Complete data set: Number of transactions by area code, type and period 
 
Table 1(b). Complete data set: Average price (in GBP) of transactions by area code, type and period 
 
The data set received from the Land Registry contained 30,724 transactions, which included 18,747 repeat 
transactions i.e., more than one transaction on the same property. There were multiple repeat transactions for some 
properties. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the data with respect to the full data set and the data set of repeat transactions. 
Because the 18,747 figure includes the initial sale, the number of annualized returns in respect of repeat transactions 
was10,555. While using this dataset, several filters are necessary, including cases where the type of the property is 
Area Codes --> CT1 CT2 ME8 Total
Total Number 8,495           7,337           14,892         30,724         
Freehold 6,036           6,186           13,746         25,968         
Leasehold 2,459           1,151           1,146           4,756           
Detached 908              1,465           2,612           4,985           
Semi-detached 2,343           2,732           5,175           10,250         
Terraced 2,887           2,045           6,061           10,993         
Flat 2,357           1,095           1,044           4,496           
New 1,132           612              672              2,416           
Old 7,363           6,725           14,220         28,308         
1995-1999 2,126           2,213           4,879           9,218           
2000-2004 2,648           2,495           4,981           10,124         
2005-2009 2,928           1,950           3,965           8,843           
2010- 793              679              1,067           2,539           
Area Codes --> CT1 CT2 ME8 Combined
Overall Average 150,414       156,598       127,520       140,794       
Freehold 158,132       165,660       131,679       145,922       
Leasehold 131,469       107,894       77,638         112,792       
Detached 243,326       238,423       192,823       215,423       
Semi-detached 145,463       143,998       130,727       137,632       
Terraced 139,344       140,350       105,137       120,671       
Flat 133,103       108,906       78,188         114,458       
New 190,589       136,889       136,543       161,953       
Old 144,238       158,392       127,094       138,988       
1995-1999 72,157         80,877         71,852         74,089         
2000-2004 142,665       151,570       126,399       136,857       
2005-2009 197,881       219,365       182,502       195,723       
2010- 210,835       241,607       182,986       207,361       
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changed between transactions. As an example, this can happen because of conversion of a house into several 
apartments at the same address. We also need to eliminate apparently unreasonably high returns which arise from 
significant price changes, typically when two transactions are recorded close together e.g., one day apart.  
Table 2(a). Data for repeat transactions: Number of transactions by area code, type and period 
 
 
Table 2(b). Data for repeat transactions: Average price (in GBP) of transactions by area code, type and period 
 
 
From Tables 1(a) and 2(a) it can be seen that the number of transactions is approximately equal for the Canterbury 
(post codes CT1 and CT2) and the Medway (post code ME8) subsets of the data. The average price for the repeat 
transactions is less than the average price for the full data set as per Tables 1(b) and 2(b).  Also, the average price 
for Canterbury transactions exceeds that for Medway transactions. 
Area Codes --> CT1 CT2 ME8 Total
Total Number 5,055           4,391           9,301           18,747         
Freehold 3,787           3,582           8,496           15,865         
Leasehold 1,268           809              805              2,882           
Detached 452              764              1,487           2,703           
Semi-detached 1,464           1,561           2,993           6,018           
Terraced 1,928           1,278           4,094           7,300           
Flat 1,211           788              727              2,726           
New 258              301              341              900              
Old 4,797           4,090           8,960           17,847         
1995-1999 1,393           1,272           3,009           5,674           
2000-2004 1,763           1,628           3,296           6,687           
2005-2009 1,459           1,144           2,407           5,010           
2010- 440              347              589              1,376           
Area Codes --> CT1 CT2 ME8 Combined
Overall Average 140,954       151,600       124,510       135,289       
Freehold 150,527       161,283       129,141       141,503       
Leasehold 112,366       108,728       75,632         101,084       
Detached 237,601       233,383       195,402       213,194       
Semi-detached 142,313       143,236       130,289       136,573       
Terraced 134,738       138,788       103,170       117,743       
Flat 113,135       109,657       75,891         102,197       
New 164,957       111,179       112,519       127,103       
Old 139,663       154,575       124,966       135,702       
1995-1999 70,295         78,928         68,643         71,354         
2000-2004 136,379       145,499       123,683       132,342       
2005-2009 192,965       217,564       181,446       193,048       
2010- 210,522       229,150       181,872       202,956       
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Because the data is for the period January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2011, the repeat transaction data is more 
voluminous during the middle portion of this time period and more closely matches the transaction volumes for all 
transactions from the 2000s onwards. This occurs because if an original sale took place before the period started the 
first sale would not be treated as a repeat sale. This effect can be seen in Figure 4.  
Figure 4. Monthly transaction volumes for CT1, CT2 and ME8 area codes and the overall HPI for Kent, England 
 
 
We considered adjusting for the “under representation” in the earlier years by excluding the first five years of 
observations. However, HPI increased very strongly between 2000 and 2008, when volumes were heavy. We 
decided not to make this adjustment because it would lead to loss of observations from a relevant period with 
different market patterns. 
With respect to the period after 2008 when volumes decreased substantially, an argument could be made that during 
this period there may have been sales desired but insufficient buyers. This is a potential problem with pricing the 
NNEG associated with the HER loan for two reasons. House sales under HER loans are triggered by biometric 
events and not house-price appreciation and during a period of lower volume there may also be lower prices. 
However, from Figure 4 it can be seen that the repeat sales in our study capture a relatively consistent proportion of 
the index volume; hence, no adjustment was made for this consideration.  
The strong overall increase in HPI shown in Figure 4 masks the extreme variability in monthly HPI experienced 
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Figure 5(a). Monthly HPI returns 
 
Figure 5(b). Autocorrelation in monthly HPI returns 
 
It is also noteworthy that monthly HPI shows significantly persistent autocorrelation as shown in Figure 5(b) (see 
Kuo 1994 for results from a different time period and region). This may prove challenging for individuals using 
models that are not based on historical data. The ARCH or GARCH models used by other authors (e.g., Li et al., 

























































































































































































approach calculates the price of the NNEG based on the actual matched sample data over a long period of time. 
Furthermore, the autocorrelation shown in Figure 5(b) is more persistent than noted by Li et al. (2010). They used 
the Nationwide Price Index and found that a strong autocorrelation effect lasts for approximately 2 years. Hosty et 
al. (2008) also analysed the Nationwide Index and found that the autocorrelation and volatility vary by region. They 
do not cite figures separately for the county of Kent so we are not able to make further comparisons to their work. 
We then compared the difference in annualized returns between the individual house price inflation to the HPI 
between transaction dates. The transaction data has exact dates, but the HPI is calculated at month ends. We used 
linear interpolation between consecutive HPI values to be able to match the period between transaction dates. We 
decided to remove the most extreme values of the differences in annualized returns between individual house price 
inflation and HPI from the subsequent analysis. For the highest 5 per cent of the annualized return differences (i.e., 
above the 95
th
 percentile) we substituted the value for the 95
th
 percentile and for lowest 0.5 per cent of the 
annualized return differences we substituted the value for the 0.5
th
 percentile, i.e., we winsorized both tails, but were 
more conservative about substituting extreme negative observations than extreme positive ones. 
The results of the winsorization process are evident in the size of the extreme left and right hand bins of Figure 6. 
From the shape of the histogram it can be seen that the return differences have a positive median. Although we 
cannot be certain of the reason for this effect, we suspect that it is due to our data being in respect of sales in 
relatively desirable urban centres in the county, whereas the HPI is calculated based on all sales within the county.  


















To remove the impact on pricing of having a positive mean, we recalculated the distribution of return differences by 
subtracting the mean difference from the data underlying Figure 6. This resulted in the distribution shown in Figure 
7, which we used to price the NNEG. Note the long left tail. 
Figure 7. De-meaned differences, both raw and maintaining duration 
We present the histogram of demeaned differences between individual house price returns and HPI returns over the 
same period based on all available matched repeat sales transactions in the dataset. We also include a ‘duration 
adjusted’ histogram that shows the distribution that would arise if we observed the return changes at the time of exit 
of a contract. This duration effect reflects the increased mass in the centre of the distribution from a longer duration 




In our analysis of the data of annualized return differences we noted a duration effect as shown in Figure 8, which is 
based on the data underlying Figure 6. The bolder horizontal lines at the top and bottom of the Figure 8 result from 
the winsorization of the data. It is particularly interesting to note that as the time between transactions increases the 
variability of return differences reduces. However, it takes at least 10 years before it might be considered stable. In 
the United States, the Federal Housing Finance Administration (FHFA) publishes estimates of the dispersion of 
house prices around the index by modelling the house prices as a diffusion whose variance naturally grows over 
time, but at a decreasing rate. This is consistent with our findings that the annualized deviations fall over time, 
though the effect is more pronounced for our sample. Our approach, instead is nonparametric, so we do not estimate 
the dispersion as a smoothed function of time. Instead, we use randomly drawn returns with matched holding 
periods in our simulation, thereby avoiding the need to model this duration effect. Figure 9 presents a comparison of 
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has a small population and so may provide an appropriate comparison to the data for the communities in Kent 
County on which this paper is based. 




Since our data is in respect of HPI in a county in England, it would be desirable to have information for England 
regarding incidence rates of entry into care and duration in care once entered. We could not find any publicly 
available sources that provided this information for the local population. However, the Intercompany Study Report 
(Gagne et al., 2011) published by the Society of Actuaries is an important source of data on LTC incidence for 
developed western countries. Figure 5a of that report shows the ratio of female to male incidence with respect to care 
requirement to be 149% for ages 65-69. Accordingly we assumed that 60 per cent of the applicants would be a couple 
with a healthy male and a female requiring care expenditures and that 40 per cent of the applicants would be a couple 
with a healthy female and a male requiring care expenditures. To evaluate the probabilities of a person requiring care 
at later ages, we used the incidence rates shown in Figure 4 of the same report (for Unlimited Benefit Period), modified 

















Figure 9. Annualized standard deviation of individual house prices around the index: Comparison with model 
estimates from Rhode Island, United States 
We plot the Federal Housing Finance Administration’s estimates for volatility (annualized) over a fifteen year 
horizon based on a diffusion model alongside the estimates from our data for Canterbury and Medway. The standard 




3.3 Simulation Steps 
To calculate the premium we used one million simulations. For each simulation a path for the original status was 
followed until an exit resulting in a house sale arose (based on Equation 2). At the point of exit and house sale a 
random drawing from the winsorized data of annualized return differences of individual house price inflation and 
HPI is made. 
In a particular simulation path, if the exit happens in year t, we restrict the pool of return differences from which we 
draw to those that were based on t-period returns. However, practical limitations are that our data only covers a 17 
year time period and the number of data points for longer durations is much smaller (because of the time period and 
the approach of using repeat transactions that occurred within this period). Hence, for durations of 15 years or longer 
we draw a return difference from the combined bin of 15 or more years. 
The accumulated premiums and the losses on house sales where price appreciation was less than the accumulated 














ranging from 1.5 per cent to 7.5 per cent were used to show the sensitivity of the NNEG to different rate 
environments.  
We used an iterative process to derive the annual NNEG charge. We normalize the initial house value to 1. We set m 
on a grid of 100 basis point steps, ranging from 0 to 400 basis points. We further add an administration charge of 20 
basis points. For each value of m, we vary c along a grid of points, and for each value of m and c, we first determine 
the initial loan based on Equation 1 above. We then determine the charge c that will result in the discounted value of 
future cash flows being equal to zero, i.e., the breakeven point. The above calculations then allow us to back out the 
maximum initial loan that is feasible under fair pricing in our data sample.  
The foregoing was based on the assumption of the maximum loan being made at initiation. Both the lender and the 
borrower might prefer to have the loan payable in instalments. In this way the borrower would only borrow as 
required and would not pay interest on unrequired amounts. Also there would be less initial outlay of funds by the 
lender increasing its lending capacity. Given the greater variability in house price returns relative to HPI over shorter 
durations, this also reduces the basis risk of the NNEG. We thus consider the case when 10 equal instalments are 
made, following the same steps as above in all other respects. 
4. Results 
Table 3(a) presents the payoffs to the PPP for three different interest rates when the loan is disbursed as a lump sum 
at loan initiation. The lowest level of c for each m that results in a non-negative payoff is highlighted in bold. The 
farthest column to the right is the backed out maximum loan value as a percentage of initial property value.  
First of all, the loan allowed in this setting is found to range from 89% at the higher end to 41% at the lower end. 
The breakeven outcomes occur for an annual NNEG charge of approximately 65 basis points when m equals 20 
basis points to a range of 140 - 170 basis points when m equals 420 basis points. An increase in the size of m (a 
fixed component) makes the charge more sensitive to the interest rate. 
Still on Table 3(a), we can see that the loan value is relatively insensitive to the interest rate level at loan initiation. 
Also, as expected, when m increases, c increases as well. This is consistent with m being fixed for the tenure of the 
loan and thus reflecting greater HPI risk and longevity risk.  
In Table 3(b) we present the case when the loan is disbursed in 10 equal annual instalments. The break-even range 
for c shifts down to the region between 13 and 37 basis points per annum. When m is at 20 basis points, c is 13 basis 





Table 3(a). Payoffs to the PPP used to determine breakeven NNEG c for each value of m and r when the loan is 
advanced as a lump sum 
For three different interest rate environments, we calculate the payoff to the PPP for a range of values of m and c. 
The number in bold is the first level of c at which the payoff is positive. The corresponding breakeven proportion of 
house value that may be loaned is in the far right column. m is in percentage points while c is in basis points. The 
value for loan allowed has been calculated as per Equation 1, including a 20 basis point administration charge per 





r = 1.5% Loan Allowed
m 20 35 50 65 80 95 110 125 140 155 170 185
0 -0.15 -0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.44 89%
1 -0.21 -0.15 -0.09 -0.03 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.32 0.37 74%
2 -0.30 -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.24 0.29 62%
3 -0.41 -0.35 -0.29 -0.23 -0.17 -0.12 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.19 50%
4 -0.55 -0.49 -0.43 -0.36 -0.30 -0.25 -0.19 -0.14 -0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.07 41%
r = 4.5% Loan Allowed
m 20 35 50 65 80 95 110 125 140 155 170 185
0 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.25 89%
1 -0.11 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.22 75%
2 -0.15 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.18 62%
3 -0.20 -0.17 -0.13 -0.10 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.13 51%
4 -0.26 -0.23 -0.20 -0.16 -0.13 -0.10 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 42%
r = 7.5% Loan Allowed
m 20 35 50 65 80 95 110 125 140 155 170 185
0 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.15 89%
1 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13 75%
2 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.11 63%
3 -0.10 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.09 53%






Table 3(b). Payoffs to the PPP used to determine breakeven NNEG c for each value of m and r when the loan is 
advanced in 10 equal instalments 
For three different interest rate environments, we calculate the payoff to the PPP for a range of values of m and c. 
The number in bold is the first level of c at which the payoff is positive. The corresponding breakeven proportion of 
house value that may be loaned is in the far right column. m is in percentage points while c is in basis points. The 
value for loan allowed has been calculated as per Equation 1, including a 20 basis point charge per year in addition 
to the m shown. 
 
 
Note that the maximum loan allowed is about 50% when the annual fixed charge in excess of the NNEG charge is 
420 basis points, leading to a total charge exceeding 450 basis points per annum. This result suggests why 
consumers may find the HER loan pricing unattractive. 420 basis points is a considerable annual charge in excess of 
the NNEG fee for such a financial product. 
These results are significant for a number of reasons. First, the results are consistent with those reported by Li et al. 
(2010) who used a model and very different assumptions for interest and mortality. Second, the results show that the 
r = 1.5% Loan Allowed
m 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43
0 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 95%
1 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 81%
2 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 69%
3 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 59%
4 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 49%
r = 4.5% Loan Allowed
m 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43
0 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 95%
1 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 81%
2 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 69%
3 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 59%
4 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 50%
r = 7.5% Loan Allowed
m 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 95%
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 82%
2 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 70%
3 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 59%






maximum loan values available to borrowers could be made attractive through an efficient pricing and 
administration mechanism under which the loans were based on a floating rate. This is undoubtedly a factor in 
explaining the low take-up rates for HER loans. Third, even greater loan amounts could be made if the loan is 
disbursed in instalments. 
5. Discussion and Further Possibilities 
In this section we discuss some further issues with the design of the loan structure and its wider applicability. One of 
the concerns for which our data is inadequate is a question of whether the risk of under-maintenance of the homes 
discussed in Section 2 has been completely accounted for. Our baseline model assumes that the maintenance is 
carried out by the homeowner because of the incentive effects of tying the repayment rate to the index; although, 
elderly or partially disabled homeowners may find this difficult or expensive. In some cases, the PPP may choose to 
raise the administrative fees to account for maintenance expenditures carried out by the PPP itself. More complexity 
can be introduced into contracts based on standards and costs of maintenance in different regions. This could be 
priced by our model, but is not the focus of this paper. 
There is also a question of wider applicability of the proposed structure. Our focus in this paper is on the provision 
of financing for LTC, as the issue will increasingly challenge policymakers. This focus allows us to suggest 
government involvement, a specific funding structure and policy response. Moreover, in the context of LTC 
considerations, it is more reasonable to model the behaviour of homeowners as seeking equity release in order to age 
in place and manage daily expenses, including care costs, and not for the purpose of seeking an additional way to 
invest in the future variability of house prices and of differences in their individual house’s price and the index. 
However, the potential for a similar lending and securitization structure open to a wider class of borrowers is worth 
evaluating carefully. A more generally available HER product based on our proposed structure may not be appealing 
to policymakers and would thus require a different level of market co-ordination and more complex rules and 
modelling considerations that are beyond the scope of this paper.  
Also, products such as home reversion agreements currently allow investors to purchase equity in individual homes, 
and to that extent they are similar to our proposals. In home reversion agreements, individual homeowners 
effectively sell a certain amount of equity in their home at a deeply discounted price that reflects their life 
expectancy and house price forecasts. The high discounts again reflect the idiosyncratic risks from individual 
properties and the combined risks built into the NNEG that affect traditional fixed rate HER products. Any 
alternative structure that would match our proposal would be based on the principle of unbundling and reallocation 
of risks, thereby attracting funders wishing to be exposed to residential real estate as an asset class. 
24 
 
Finally, a further possibility exists for policymakers to lay off more risk. In the United States, the FHFA has recently 
made successful efforts to pass some credit risk to private parties (Goodman et al., 2013). This shows that it may be 
further possible for the state to pass some risk from an NNEG to the private sector through the PPP’s residual 
account.  
A second securitisation of the residual account (in the PPP) is possible in order that private investors could share the 
risk of the NNEG. Income to the residual account occurs from: 
 NNEG premiums incorporated into the loans,  
 the fee charged for administrative, maintenance and servicing included in the loans; and 
 settlement payments when the residual account is negative.  
Payments from the residual account occur from: 
 payments required by the NNEG when the loan value exceeds the house value on sale;  
 expenses incurred by the PPP for administration, maintenance and servicing; and 
 dividends to investors to share any profits in the residual account. 
The payments on the NNEG arise because the loan value exceeds the house value on sale. The date at which this 
comparison takes place is on the sale of the house due to either institutionalization or on death. Hence, the risk 
associated with the NNEG includes both morbidity and mortality. Where the house price at sale exceeds the value of 
the loan, the homeowner would have the option to receive the excess on sale or to seek a mortgage for the loan 
amount and retain the home. If the expected sale price is close to the loan value, and if the property were deemed 
suitable for social housing, the homeowner might agree to transfer ownership to the PPP and reduce sale related 
costs, so that the home could be used for social housing.  
Andrews (2012) discusses this type of product design and proposes that differences between the expected date of 
entry into care and the actual date of entry into care could be handled by a swap. If this were done then the 
securitization of the residual account would be a pure play on the efficiency of the loan process and deviations in 
actual house price improvement from the HPI. Some financial institutions might prefer such a ‘purer’ securitization; 
hence, the available market for participation in these financial transactions might be broadened by having both a 
swap and a securitization, which could lead to greater efficiency. In the absence of such a swap, any differences 
between expected and actual date of entry into care would be part of the residual account. 
6. Conclusion 
We have shown that disbursing the loan in instalments decreases the required NNEG premium and could be used as 
a way to increase the maximum loan value, potentially resulting in loan values of up to 95 per cent of appraised 
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value. It is important for authorities or private institutions to organise the collection of more data that would allow 
for greater precision in pricing, and reduce the range of uncertainty. However, the results are so strikingly different 
from the pricing that appears to be available in the market today that greater consideration regarding how the HER 
loan is structured is warranted. 
Our findings have implications for HER products in general and especially for HER products related to LTC. 
Davidson (2009) suggests that HER may affect demand for LTC insurance and is a substitute for such insurance. 
Our proposed structure may also be generalized and widened to offer an alternative approach to the challenges 
recognized by Shiller and Weiss (1999) in terms of offering home equity insurance to homeowners. 
Population aging is increasing the interest in LTC provision. Various reports (e.g., Sutherland, 1999) have 
recommended that England provide a better organised system of LTC provision, but their recommendations have 
not been implemented fully because they have been judged too costly, among reasons given. Following the most 
recent commission’s report (Dilnot et al., 2011), the government has proposed legislation that revises the available 
financial support regarding LTC. In view of this, the paper has a practical application. It proposes a specific HER 
loan in respect of LTC costs that might be provided by a PPP, where the loan administration would be highly 
efficient and the NNEG risk could be borne by private investors through a securitization. This would support the 
government’s proposed legislation and help address increasing concerns about long-term care financing for the 
elderly. 
The market associated with the provision of the NNEG exhibits unfulfilled potential. If the market structure 
demonstrated in this paper were adopted, we expect that a more competitive market in HER loans would be 
available. 
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